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OFFICE OF CONSUMER ADVOCATE

DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

MARCOS MUNOZ

IN RE: LIBERTY UTILITIES (MIDSTATES NATURAL GAS) CORP. d/b/a LIBERTY UTILITIES DOCKET NO. RPU-2016-0003

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- Q: What is your name and business address?
- A: My name is Marcos Munoz. My business address is 1375 East Court Avenue,

 Des Moines, Iowa 50319-0063.
- 4 Q: By whom are you employed?

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- A: I am employed by the Office of Consumer Advocate (OCA) of the Iowa

 Department of Justice as a Utility Analyst.
- Q: Please describe your educational background.
 - I received Bachelor's and Master's degrees in Economics from New Mexico

 State University in 2007 and 2010 respectively. My Master's degree focused on

 Public Utility Regulation and emphasized National Association of Regulatory

 Utility Commissioners (NARUC) ratemaking techniques in the application and simulation of revenue requirement and cost of service studies. In addition to my academic training in utility regulation, I hold the professional designation of

 Certified Rate of Return Analyst (CRRA) awarded by the Society of Utility and

 Regulatory Financial Analysts (SURFA).

My academic experience includes applied econometric analysis in financial and cost economics. I performed research regarding the financial consequences of utility restructuring and its risks, specifically the implications of removing ring-fencing mechanisms that pertain to the repeal of the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA). I also performed research regarding

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return expectations and the effects of public expenditure programs in the reduction of market volatility.

Q: Please describe your professional background.

A:

Prior to joining the OCA in June 2010, I worked for a financial and research firm. While in college, I had the opportunity to participate in the formulation of a feasibility study for the development of a wind farm facility intended to provide distributed generation to the border states of Chihuahua, Mexico and New Mexico. I primarily concentrated on analyzing the social and political regulatory environment in Mexico. I also assisted in designing finance strategies for the promotion of wind energy in developing countries through a Kyoto protocol program called, "Clean Development Mechanisms."

Since joining the OCA, I have concentrated on equity return research and assisting other staff in the development and implementation of cost of equity and cost of capital valuation models. I have analyzed avoided cost studies, O&M calculations, demand projections, and fuel cost projections. I have also been responsible for analyzing transmission costs and planning, general class cost of service issues, and interconnection tariff revisions. I have also reviewed purchased gas adjustment filings and natural gas hedging plans.

In addition to my employment at OCA, I have taught economics, international business, and statistics at Grandview University and Des Moines

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Area Community College in Des Moines.

Q: What is the purpose of your testimony?

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- A: The purpose of my testimony is to recommend an appropriate rate of return on common equity (ROE), capital structure, and weighted average cost of capital (WACC) for Liberty Utilities (Midstates Natural Gas) Corp. d/b/a/ Liberty Utilities (Liberty). Lastly, I respond to Liberty's witness Mr. Keith Magee regarding his testimonies about these financial issues.
- Q: Have you prepared an exhibit or schedules?
- A: Yes. I prepared Schedules A through F, which are attached to this testimony.

Summary of Recommendations

- Q: Would you please summarize your recommendations?
- A: Yes. As shown in my Schedule A, I recommend an ROE of 9.2% and a capital structure that consists of 53% long-term debt and 47% common equity. The resulting WACC is 6.884%.

Return on Common Equity Capital

- Q: What is the cost of common equity capital, and why is it important in the regulatory process?
- A: The cost of equity capital is an investor's expected return on his or her equity investment in a regulated public utility. Regulation provides public utilities with

NOTE: Confidential material has been identified by placing it between curly brackets { }

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the opportunity to recover their reasonably incurred costs including a reasonable return on its investment. A reasonable rate of return allowed on an equity investment should be equal to the cost of the equity capital.

Rates that are set to generate a return on common equity exceeding the utility's cost of common equity capital are unreasonable and will result in windfall profits paid by the ratepayers to the regulated public utility. The opposite is true if the allowed return on common equity capital is below the cost of the equity capital investment. If the allowed return is less than the utility's cost of capital, a regulated public utility will realize challenges in acquiring equity capital to meet its service obligation.

- Q: Can you describe the principles used to estimate the cost of common equity?
- A: Yes. Under the rate making process, a regulated utility is allowed the opportunity to earn a fair and reasonable rate of return on its investment used to provide safe and reliable service. The Iowa Utilities Board (IUB) establishes a fair and reasonable rate of return by considering, among other things, the reasonable and comparable cost of equity of similar-risk companies, the sufficiency of the rate of return to preserve a company's financial integrity, and the ability of the rate of return to sustain capital attraction in the future.
- Q: Can one estimate the cost of equity with the same precision used in

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determining the cost of debt?

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A: No. The cost of debt is precisely measurable by analyzing interest payments, maturities, and issue prices. The cost of equity takes into account subjective parameters such as relative risks and investor expectations. My analysis uses a group of proxy utility companies to estimate Liberty's cost of common equity using the continuous compounding form of the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Model. I also used the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to check my DCF results.

The Proxy Group

- Q: How did you select the sample of natural gas utilities used to determine an estimate of the cost of common equity?
- A: I began my analysis by looking at companies in the Natural Gas Utility industry Survey as provided by *Value Line*. In my opinion, the broad measures of business and financial risk of these companies are representative of Liberty.
- Q: Which natural gas utilities did you select?
- A: I selected seven companies contained in the 2016 third quarter edition of *Value Line's* Natural Gas Utility industry survey. These companies are Atmos Energy, Spire Inc., New Jersey Resources Corporation, Northwest Natural Gas Company, South Jersey Industries, Inc., Southwest Gas, and WGL Holdings,

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Inc. Both Mr. Magee and I agree that these companies have investment risks similar to the risks realized by Liberty.

The DCF Model

Q: What is the economic foundation for using the DCF Model?

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A:

The price an investor is willing to pay for an investment under any market condition depends on, and is equal to, the present value of the expected future income stream the investment generates. The DCF Model accurately reflects price based upon the present value of expected future income streams. The future income stream may take the form of cash dividends or capital gains. The combination of current and future income streams is what the investor relies upon in determining the investor's expected return on investment. Thus, in the DCF Model, the discount rate measures the expected market return on an equity investment and reflects the cost of the equity investment.

Q: Why should we use the DCF Model to estimate the cost of common equity?

A: Investors use the DCF Model as a tool to calculate expected returns on common equity and assist in financial decision-making. The DCF Model considers market prices that reflect the most current information. Investors rely on the same market information incorporated in the DCF Model to determine the discount rate they expect to apply to their equity investments.

Q: Are capital markets efficient?

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- A: Yes. Capital markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange, are efficient as a result of participant competition and the free flow of information. When information becomes available, competition between participants will drive the price of an investment to the point where investors have the opportunity to earn their cost of common equity, but no more.
- Q: Would you explain how the DCF Model works?

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- A: Yes. The DCF Model considers the cash flows that investors expect to receive.

 The cost of common equity, expressed as K, is equal to D/P + G, where D is the dividend, P is the price of the investment, and G is the expected growth rate.
- Q: Does the DCF analysis take into account other investment opportunities?
- A: Yes. Investor interaction in capital markets drives prices that the DCF Model incorporates. The markets and prices should reflect all of the investors' opportunities.
- Q: Please explain why it is appropriate to rely on the continuous compounding DCF Model in estimating a utility's cost of common equity.
- A: Continuous compounding is widely used as a measure to understand the time value of a long-term holding period investment such as debt and/or equity. As opposed to the discrete DCF Model (which incorrectly assumes that a company accrues revenues and compounds dividends in discrete quarterly intervals), the continuous compounding DCF Model assumes that companies actually earn,

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accrue, and receive revenues continuously throughout the year on a daily or continuous basis (not just quarterly basis). This continuous stream of revenues compounds over time, and utilities pay shareholders the compounded earnings through dividends.

Q: What market prices did you use in your DCF calculations?

- A: As shown in my Schedule C, page 1, col. (c), I calculated an average weekly price for the twelve-month period ending July 25, 2016, for each company included in my proxy group and used this price in my DCF calculation. An average price over this recent 12-month period is more likely to be representative and conform to current market conditions than a single price in time or a monthly average price, and short-term market aberrations are less likely to influence average prices.
- Q: What dividend did you use in your DCF analysis to calculate the cost of common equity for Liberty?
- A: I used the indicated dividend for each of the companies in my proxy group. The indicated dividend is the most recently declared quarterly dividend annualized (or multiplied by four). The indicated dividend reflects the fact that firms generally pay dividends four times per year. Thus, the indicated dividend is the best information available to investors for estimating the expected future annual dividends. My Schedule C, page 1, col. (d), shows the average indicated

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dividend for each company included in my proxy group.

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- Q: Why is the indicated dividend the best measure available to determine the expected dividend?
- A: The indicated dividend measures investors' expected dividend payment based upon the following four assumptions:
 - (1) indicated dividends reflect the most recently declared quarterly dividend annualized as though the same amount was paid each quarter for the entire year,
 - (2) firms are not required to increase their dividends,
 - (3) dividends are normally increased if the firm believes the increase is sustainable in the future, and
 - (4) dividends are not lowered in low-earning periods (unless the lowered earnings are expected to continue).

As a result, the indicated dividend is the most recent and most accurate indicator available to investors regarding a firm's prospective annual dividend payments.

- Q: Did Liberty witness Mr. Magee also rely on the indicated dividend?
- A: No. In contrast to my dividend recommendation, Mr. Magee relied upon a speculative projected dividend rather than actual achieved dividends. Mr. Magee assumes that each company in his proxy group will be increasing its yearly dividend consistently during future periods.

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1	PUBLIC Q: Is Mr. Magee's assumption that dividends will consistently increase			
	Q.			
2		reasonable?		
3	A :	No. This assumption is not likely to be accurate because dividend forecasts tend		
4		to be overly optimistic and because dividend payments are a function of		
5		earnings and the companies' dividend payout policies. There is no guarantee		
6		that the proxy companies will, in fact, constantly increase their dividend		
7		payouts, and Mr. Magee has not provided any evidence that support his		
8		contention that they will.		
9	Q:	How did you calculate the dividend yield?		
10	A:	I calculated the dividend yield by dividing the indicated annual dividend by the		
11		average 52-week closing stock prices between August 2015 and July 2016. I		
12		show my dividend yield calculations in my Schedule C, page 1, column (e).		
13	Q:	What are the characteristics of the appropriate growth rate to incorporate		
14		into the DCF Model?		
15	A: The DCF Model should incorporate long-term and sustainable growth rates			
16	expected over the life of the investment. In steady state equilibrium, the			
17	perpetual sustainable growth in earnings per share (EPS), dividend per share			
18	(DPS), and book value per share (BVPS) will equal the internal growth rate (br).			
19		On the other hand, businesses operate under changing economic and market		
20	circumstances, not in perpetual steady state equilibrium. Thus, in the immediate			

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PUBLIC term, the growth in EPS, DPS, BVPS, and the internal growth (br) rate will not be the same. As a result, one has to determine the measures of dividend growth that are most representative of the long-run sustainable future given the performance of the company in the particular period being evaluated. Did you rely on EPS as your sole basis for determining a sustainable growth rate? No. Focusing solely on EPS to determine growth rates can lead to unsustainable results. Cyclical market conditions influence EPS. Market cyclicality can cause EPS to drastically change over time and affect EPS growth trends. Please describe how you determined the growth rate you incorporated in your DCF Model to determine Liberty's current cost of equity. I determined the long-run sustainable growth rate for each company in my proxy group by examining each company's historical financial performance, the factors that influenced that performance, and the factors that could and/or would affect each company's future performance. I examined each company's historical EPS, BVPS, and DPS set forth in each company's *Value Line* survey. I then used this information to compute the historical internal growth rate in order to determine reasonable measurements of sustainable growth. How did you determine the expected sustainable growth rates for EPS,

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A: I relied on the 5-year and 10-year historical EPS, BVPS, and DPS growth rates published by *Value Line* for each company included in my proxy group. OCA Exhibit Munoz Direct Schedule C, page 2 shows the historical financial information for EPS, BVPS, and DPS.

Q: How did you estimate the internal growth rate?

A:

I estimated the internal growth rate (br) by looking at the historical payout policy of each of the utilities in the proxy group. The percentage difference between the historical dividend payments and earnings is known as the payout ratio (1-b), where 1 represents 100% of earnings paid and (b) is the ratio of dividends retained by the company (also known as the retention ratio). Since there are no accurate measures for either a company's future dividend-payout policy or its retention ratio (b), I relied on the historical five- and ten-year measures of the retention ratio (b) as a reasonable estimate. Next, I multiplied the retention ratio (b) for each of the past ten years by the historical achieved return on book equity (r) to arrive at the five- and ten-year internal growth rate (br) for each company.

After computing the internal growth rate, I considered the impact of an external financing (S x V) factor on each company's internal growth rate. I calculated the external financing impact by adjusting the historical changes in share issuance and multiplying the percentage change in shares by each year's

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- PUBLIC 1 market-to-book ratio. The resulting internal growth rate for each company (br) is shown in my Schedule C, pages 3 through 9. 2 How did you determine the appropriate long-run sustainable growth rate? 3 Q: **A**: I relied on the median growth rate for each company derived from all the 4 5 measures of historical growth (EPS, BVPS, DPS, and internal growth) as the 6 appropriate measure of central tendency as shown in my Schedule C. 7 Q: Does a firm's historical performance provide data to better estimate a sustainable growth rate than analyst growth rate forecasts? 8 9 **A**: Yes. Analysts tend to overstate growth rate forecasts, because analysts tend to be overly optimistic with their EPS and DPS growth forecasts. In addition, 10 forecasts of DPS and EPS growth rates focus on short-term projections. Short-11 12 term growth rate projections do not accurately reflect the DCF Model's assumed perpetual holding period of an equity investment. Moreover, the assumptions 13 and data used in short-term growth forecasts are rarely available for public 14 consumption. This means that the public has to rely on the analysts' EPS 15 forecast information without being able to determine if the assumptions, data, or 16 analysis relied upon to generate these forecasts are accurate. 17 Did Mr. Magee rely upon the proxy companies' historical performance to Q: 18
 - estimate the DCF dividend growth rate?

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A: No. Instead, Mr. Magee relied upon overly optimistic assumptions of dividend

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growth that are not justified by the companies' actual performance. Mr. Magee relied on expected EPS growth without consideration of any other measure of dividend growth. Reliance on a single speculative measure of growth can lead to unreliable cost of equity estimates when the measures are inflated, upwardly biased, and overly optimistic. In fact, *Value Line* has revised its EPS projections to make it more in line with other analysts' forecasted EPS estimates after acknowledging that EPS projections have been consistently higher than other sources.

Q: What long-run growth rate range did you determine to be sustainable?

- A: I determined that a sustainable growth rate range for the companies in my proxy group ranges between a low of -1.0% and a high of 11.4%. Since the result of my growth rate range is large, I selected a growth rate range based on the median for each company included in my proxy. Ultimately, I believe that a reasonable growth range for Liberty would fall between 2.5% and 7.9% as shown on OCA Exhibit Munoz Direct, Schedule C, page 1, col. (f).
- Q: Based on your DCF Model and the above information, what is Liberty's cost of common equity?
- A: Using my DCF cost of equity for the companies in my proxy group as shown on my Schedule C, page 1, I conclude that a cost of common equity in the median of my DCF range, or 9.2%, reasonably compensates investors for their expected

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return on common equity for Liberty.

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My cost of common equity recommendation is based on the level of risk faced by Liberty as it operates now. If the Board grants Liberty's proposed changes to dramatically increase the monthly customer charge whereby it shifts more fixed cost recovery to a non-volumetric rate-design, my recommended cost of common equity would need to be reduced to reflect the new, reduced level of risk faced by Liberty.

- Q: Did you use the CAPM to check your DCF Model cost of common equity calculation?
- A: Yes. By applying the CAPM to the proxy group of comparable companies, I calculated the current cost of common equity rate to be between 8.5% and 9.1%. My recommended ROE of 9.2% is just slightly over the top end of the range produced by the CAPM.
- Q: How is the cost of common equity estimated using the CAPM?
- A: The CAPM model adds the company's specific risk premium to the risk-free interest rate. The CAPM equation is:

$$K = I + (b * RP),$$

where K is the cost of common equity, I is the risk-free interest rate, b is beta, and RP is the market risk premium. The market risk premium is the market return (MR) less the risk-free interest rate.

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Q: How did you calculate the risk-free interest rate component of the risk premium?

A:

U.S. Treasury securities are commonly used to measure the risk-free rate of return. According to Roger G. Ibbotson, 2016 SBBI Yearbook now published by Duff & Phelps, the geometric mean of annual total returns for long-term government bonds (*i.e.*, those with a 20-year maturity) for the period 1926-2015 is 5.6%. I believe that this 5.6% return is a reliable indicator of the risk-free interest rate. Historical total annual return is composed of income, capital appreciation, and reinvestment income. Using historical total returns provided by U.S. Treasury bonds as the measure of the risk-free rate of return better reflects investors' expected return on bond holdings than do current Treasury bond yields that change on a daily basis. Using U.S. Treasury bond yields that change continuously would distort the risk-free calculation results. Using historical total annual return eliminates the external distortion included when using current yields on U.S. Treasury bonds. Moreover, using historical total annual returns also eliminates the need to rely on speculative projected yields.

- Q: Is the average 30-day yield on 10-year, 20-year, and 30-year US Treasury bonds a reliable indicator of the risk-free rate?
- A: No. The average 30-day yield on 10-year, 20-year, and 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds is not reflective of long-term trends. Current and average 30-day yields

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on 10-year, 20-year, and 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds are a function of the Federal Reserve Board's policy to increase nominal GDP by maintaining low interest rates through monetary easing through the purchasing of 10-year, 20-year, and 30-year long-term U.S. Treasury bonds. In addition to the Federal Reserve Board's policy, the current yields on 10-year, 20-year, and 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds do not reflect the increased demand in U.S. Treasury bond maturities.

Q: On what market return did you rely?

A: I relied on Roger Ibbotson's geometric mean of the total market returns from the Standard & Poor's 500 (S&P 500) between 1926 and 2015. The geometric mean of Ibbotson 2016 SBBI Yearbook now published by Duff & Phelps's S&P 500 total market return is 10.0%. My reliance on a 10.0% market return is consistent with Dr. Ibbotson and Dr. Chen's long-run market outlook. Dr. Ibbotson and Dr. Chen, financial experts and authors of Duff and Phelps's 2016 SBBI Yearbook, publish historical data based on a projected supply-side model that predicts a total market return that will average 9.28% over the long run, assuming historical inflation rates.¹

Q: Why is the geometric mean a good indicator of average market return?

A: The geometric mean accurately measures historical rate of return averages of an

¹ Ibbotson, Roger G. and Peng, Chen. 2016 Ibbotson ® SBBI ® Duff & Phelps, *Supply Model*, Chapter 10, page 31.

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investment over time. Because it smoothes out the non-normal distribution of compounded total return averages, it is a reliable indicator of expected returns. On the other hand, Mr. Magee relied on arithmetic average returns to estimate the risk premium. My discussion of why it is important to rely on geometric mean as opposed to arithmetic mean to estimate equity returns is in the response section of my testimony.

Q: What market risk premium did you assume in your analysis?

- A: I assumed a market risk premium of 4.4%. I calculated this 4.4% risk premium by taking the difference between the estimated geometric market return of 10.0% and the 20-year U.S. Treasury bonds geometric mean return of 5.6% as shown in my Schedule D, Table I. Furthermore, my equity risk premium result is similar to Dr. Ibbotson's supply-side earnings model projected market risk premium of 4.04% and falls within the IUB reasonable risk premium range of 250 to 450 basis points above the yield on A-rated public utility bonds.
- Q: Do you believe the market risk premium is a reliable measure of the cost of equity for Liberty?
- A: No. There is significant empirical evidence of historical volatility in the market risk premium. Over time, the relationship between the market risk premium and interest rates has changed as the volatility in equity market return has decreased and volatility in the bond market has increased. As shown in my Schedule E,

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page 1, the changes in risk of U.S. Treasury bills between 1926 and 2015 have produced a distribution of the risk premiums ranging from a negative 44.4% to a positive 53.5% with a risk premium standard deviation of approximately 21%. The standard deviation of the market risk premium is more than half the risk premium average. If the average of the historical risk premiums has a variance of this magnitude, then the result is not statistically significant, and inferences based on this data would not be reliable.

Q: What are betas, and how did you calculate them?

A:

Betas are a measure of a company's systemic non-diversifiable equity risk.

Betas measure the price movements of a firm's stock in relation to the price movements of the overall stock market. Thus, betas measure a security's risk relative to the overall market. The overall market has a beta of one. Securities that are riskier than the market will have betas that are greater than one.

Securities that are less risky than the market will have betas that are less than one. Betas also measure the relative riskiness between firms. For example, a firm that has a beta of 0.4 is typically less risky than a firm that has a beta of 0.6.

I used *Value Line's* adjusted betas for my proxy group of natural gas utilities. The adjusted beta for my proxy group of companies falls within a range between 0.65 and 0.80. The average beta for the proxy group is 0.74 as shown in my Schedule D, Table II. Since betas indicate relative estimates of

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PUBLIC 1 risk, the higher the beta, the higher the risk and the higher the cost of common equity. These betas, ranging from 0.65 to 0.85, reflect a lower risk than the 2 Standard & Poor's 500 that has a beta of 1.0. 3 What is Liberty's current cost of common equity as calculated using the 4 Q: 5 **CAPM model?** Using the CAPM model on my proxy group, I calculated Liberty's current cost 6 **A**: of equity to be between 8.5% and 9.1% as shown in OCA Exhibit Munoz 7 Direct, Schedule D, Table III. 8 9 Q: What did you conclude about your DCF Model results based upon the results from the CAPM model? 10 My recommended cost of equity of 9.2% falls slightly outside my CAPM range **A**: 11 12 of 8.5% and 9.1% and reasonably reflects a fair ROE for Liberty. Using CAPM as a check confirms the more reliable DCF results on which I base my ROE 13 recommendation. 14 **Cost of Capital** 15 16 Q: What is the cost of capital? **A**: The cost of capital is a company's cost to obtain debt and equity capital. It is 17 used as the discount rate to determine the value of any investment project. 18 19 Common and preferred equity investors and holders of long-term debt provide 20 capital funds.

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Q: What is the WACC?

A:

A: The WACC is the expected return on a portfolio of all of a firm's securities. The average cost of capital is the best indicator of a company's overall rate of return. It measures the appropriate cost-weight given to each capital component. Most importantly, applying the WACC as a utility company's allowed rate of return provides the utility company the opportunity to earn revenues sufficient to cover its long-term debt interest, preferred equity costs, and a return on its common equity investment. It is the WACC that is ultimately used by regulators to determine the return allowed on a utility's rate base.

Q: Why should rates of return be set based on the WACC?

Financial theory asserts that firms make investment decisions to maximize the value of an investment. The profit maximization objective induces investors to make investment decisions in projects with internal rates of return that are equal to or greater than their cost of capital. In a competitive environment, equilibrium is reached when the marginal yield on an investment is zero. In other words, the return on the last investment project is equal to its cost. Since regulation is a surrogate for competition, the theoretical evidence of financial theory asserts that a natural monopoly's "fair rate of return" should equal the cost of the capital supporting the company's investment. In this case, the cost of the capital recognized by a company should be equal to its WACC.

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Q: What would be the consequence of not setting the allowed rate of return equal to the WACC?

Returns in excess of the company's WACC are paid by ratepayers through higher rates that provide for revenues that contribute to a return in excess of the utility's authorized rate of return. In contrast, returns lower than the WACC will not produce sufficient returns to cover all costs of long-term debt, preferred equity, and expected stockholder returns on their common equity investment. Consequently, the utility will have a diminished ability to access capital markets in order to procure capital that is necessary to provide safe and reliable service.

Capital Structure

Q: What is Liberty's actual capital structure?

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Liberty's capital structure is 100% common equity, because Liberty has not issued any long-term debt. As shown in my Schedule F, Liberty does not obtain capital directly from the capital market, but rather is financed solely through its parent companies. What this means is that Liberty's capital structure is artificially created by its parent companies. Since Liberty does not issue any long-term debt and has no outstanding financial obligation to service any long-term debt, it is as if Liberty is financing its service operation entirely with common equity.

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Q: Is it reasonable to set regulated natural gas rates for Liberty's Iowa operations using a capital structure that consists solely of 100% common equity capital?

A: No. In fact, it is telling that not even Liberty is proposing to use its actual capital structure to set rates in this proceeding. Company witness Magee proposed a hypothetical capital structure that consists of 46% long-term debt and 54% common equity.

It is inefficient and unreasonably expensive to finance regulated utility operations with either high amounts or entirely common equity capital, which is generally the most expensive capital in the marketplace. The cost of long-term debt is considerably lower than the cost of common equity capital. Furthermore, the interest on long-term debt is deductible in computing the company's annual income tax liability. Thus, there are significant income tax savings from including long-term debt in the mix of capital relied on to finance the company. Giving up these tax benefits would be inefficient. Because utilities in Iowa are required by law to operate in an efficient manner, they should and do take advantage of the lower financing costs and tax advantages associated with long-term debt.

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1	PUBLIC Q: You mentioned that Company witness Magee proposed a hypothetical				
2		capital structure that includes 46% long-term debt. Do you agree that Mr.			
3		Magee's proposed capital structure is reasonable?			
4	A :	No. In my opinion, his proposed capital structure that reflects only 46% long-			
5		term debt is inefficient and unreasonable and should not be approved by the			
6 Board in this proceeding.		Board in this proceeding.			
7	Q:	What capital structure do you recommend be approved by the Board in			
8		this proceeding?			
9	A:	I recommend a capital structure that reflects 53% long-term-debt and 47%			
10		common equity. This is set forth on my Schedule A, page 1.			
11	Q:	Q: Because Liberty has not issued any long-term debt of its own, how did you			
12		determine that a capital structure with 53% long-term debt and 47%			
13		common equity is an efficient and reasonable capital structure to			
recommend in this proceeding?		recommend in this proceeding?			
15	A:	I again relied on the proxy companies that I used to estimate Liberty's cost of			
16		common equity. In addition, I looked at the amount of long-term debt issued by			
17		Liberty's parent companies as indicators of the amount of long-term debt that is			
18		actually financing Liberty.			
19	Q:	Q: Why did you look at the proxy companies for your capital structure			
20	recommendation?				
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A: Because the proxy companies have utility operations and risks similar to Liberty and were the basis for my ROE recommendation, I believed that they would be useful in determining the appropriate capital structure for Liberty. For example, the equity ratios for the seven proxy companies range from a low of 47% common equity and 53% debt to a high of 57.5% common equity and 42.5% debt. Q: How did you go about estimating the amount of long-term debt outstanding at the parent company level used to finance Liberty? **A**: It is important to understand that Liberty is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Liberty Utilities Corporation (LUCO), and LUCO is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp. (Algonquin). Each of these parent companies have issued long-term debt, a portion of which essentially finances Liberty. Q: What is LUCO's capital structure? **A**: LUCO's 13-month average capital structure ending in June 2016 has a common equity and long-term debt ratio that includes approximately { equity and { long-term debt. What are the balances of long-term debt in LUCO's capital structure? Q: **A**: As shown on page 2 of my Confidential Schedule A, LUCO's long-term debt balance is {

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		RPU-2016-0003	
		PUBLIC	
1	Q:	What is Algonquin's capital structure?	
2	A: Algonquin's 13-month average capital structure ending in June 2016 is made		
3		of approximately {	
4		long-term debt. Algonquin's 13-month average long-term debt balance is	
5		and its 13-month average common equity balance is	
6		{ [
7	Q:	Q: How does Algonquin's capital structure information impact your	
8		recommendation?	
9	A:	Since LUCO's common equity ratio is made up of a blend of other sources of	
0		capital, LUCO's common equity ratio has to reflect its relationship to Algonquin	
1		and the financial synergies associated with this relationship. The recognition of	
2		other sources of capital in LUCO's capital structure justify a much lower	
3		common equity ratio than the equity ratio recommended by Liberty.	
4	Q:	What is LUCO's effective common equity ratio?	
5	A:	As shown in my Confidential Schedule A, page 3, LUCO's effective common	
6		equity ratio is actually approximately {	
7	Q: How did you determine LUCO's effective common equity ratio to be		
8		{ [] ?	
9	A:	As shown on page 3 of my Confidential Schedule A, page 2, line 7, LUCO's 13-	
20		month average ending June 2016 common equity ratio is {}. But this does	
		27	
	NOTE	: Confidential material has been identified by placing it between curly brackets { }.	

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Q:

A:

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not present an accurate picture of the amount of long-term debt financing at LUCO. To determine the effective capital structure, one must assume that a certain percentage of LUCO's common equity ratio is attributed to capital from Algonquin. For example, as shown in my Confidential Schedule A, page 3, lines 10 to 12, LUCO's capital structure is composed of { preferred } common equity, and { attributable to Algonquin's percentages in LUCO's common equity ratio by multiplying column (B) with column (C) in lines 10 to 12 of my Confidential Schedule A, page 3. If LUCO's effective capital structure reflects { common equity and long-term debt, how did you arrive at your recommended capital structure of 47% common equity and 53% long-term debt for Liberty? effective equity ratio falls outside of the range of reasonableness of the proxy companies that I relied on to determine the cost of equity for Liberty. Although the LUCO effective capital structure reflects the financial synergies that exist within Algonquin's corporate structure, LUCO's effective capital structure does not reflect the financial reality of the relative risk associated with my proxy companies. As a result, I recommend a capital structure of 47% common equity and 53% long-term debt. My recommended capital structure is more in line with the financial risk associated with the proxy companies used to

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determine the ROE in order to produce a cost of capital reflective of Liberty's relative risk. In other words, although LUCO's effective capital structure informs the relative reasonableness of a capital structure for Liberty, it does not determine my overall recommendation.

Q: Why did you not rely on the average common equity ratio as a reasonable proxy for a hypothetical capital structure?

I did not rely on the average equity ratio of the proxy companies of 54% because the effective capital structure of LUCO suggests something significantly lower. The financial risk of LUCO's capital structure suggest that Liberty's equity ratio is at the lower tier of risk given the financial risk profile and financial synergies that exist within the corporate structure and ownership of Liberty. These financial risk reductions justify a common equity ratio lower than the average of the proxy companies. A 47% common equity ratio reflects those financial risk considerations while taking into account the actual capital financing of Liberty's operations.

Q: Using your recommended capital structure, what is Liberty's WACC?

As shown in my Confidential Schedule A, I recommend a WACC of 6.884% for Liberty based on a 47% common equity ratio and 53% long-term debt capital structure.

A:

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Response to Mr. Keith Magee

Q: Do you have any opinion on Mr. Magee's DCF results?

A:

Yes. Mr. Magee's mean and median DCF results shown in the "Mean ROE" column, column 11, of Keith Magee Exhibit 1, closely match my DCF recommendation and are a more reliable predictor of the cost of equity.

However, Mr. Magee's exclusive reliance on forecasted EPS as the single measure of dividend growth produced high end outliers for each company which are not representative of the cost of equity.

Based on the information provided by Mr. Magee, it is not clear if the high end results are part of his consideration for estimating Liberty's cost of equity or if Mr. Magee adhered to just the "Mean ROE" column shown in column 11 of Keith Magee Exhibit 1. In my opinion, the cost of equity estimates Mr. Magee should rely on must adhere to a measure of central tendency, mean or median. The frequency and distribution of his DCF results will indicate that the mean results shown in column 11 of his schedule Keith Magee Exhibit 1 are statistically reliable and closely match my range of reasonableness and recommendation.

Q: Do you believe a flotation cost adjustment is applicable to Liberty's cost of equity as proposed by Mr. Magee?

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A:

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No. A flotation cost adjustment in the manner presented by Mr. Magee is not applicable. Share issuance cost recovery from issuing new shares should be explicit and the cost should be included above-the-line and not included in the calculation of the ROE. Furthermore, the argument for a flotation cost adjustment and recovery based on adding an issuance cost rate to the dividend is also incorrect. Perpetual cost recovery based on a calculated share issuance rate is just an attempt to inflate the ROE. The data from the proxy companies indicates that no additional cost rate should be added to the ROE estimate since the average price-to-book ratio of the utilities in my proxy group already account for a fair rate sufficient to recover any issuance cost rate based on my ROE recommendation. As shown on OCA Exhibit Munoz Direct, Schedule B, page 1, the average price-to-book-ration is 2.0. This ratio indicates that share equity prices trade far above book value and already account for any market pressure of new share issuance. The Board has previously denied requests for flotation cost adjustments premised on the same arguments of share issuance expense and market pressure.²

Q: Do you have any concern regarding Mr. Magee's ROE estimates based upon his CAPM?

² In re: Iowa-American Water Company, Docket No. RPU-2013-0002, Final Order (Feb. 28, 2014), page 20.

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A: Yes. I am concerned with Mr. Magee's current market risk premium (MRP) of 10.5% and 11.18%, and his expected market risk premium of 9.99% and 10.68%. First, Mr. Magee distorts his current MRP of 10.5% and 11.18% by relying on a DCF average market return of 13.14% based on Value Line's S&P 500 market return and 13.83% DCF market return based on Bloomberg's total market return information. Mr. Magee further distorts his MRP calculation by only relying on the current Treasury bond yield of 2.65% as published by Bloomberg Professionals. Second, Mr. Magee calculated his forward-looking MRP by relying on the same speculative S&P 500 market return used in his calculation of the current MRP and a speculative risk-free rate of 3.15%. Both S&P 500 average market returns (*Value Line* and Bloomberg) were derived using only the simple arithmetic average. Q: Do you agree with Mr. Magee's calculation of his DCF market return for his forward-looking CAPM MRP? No. In direct contrast with 80 years of historical market returns, Mr. Magee **A**: relies on a DCF market return of 13.14% based on Value Line's S&P 500 market return and 13.83% DCF market return based on Bloomberg's total market return information. Both expected market returns assume perpetual earnings growth rate of 10.89% and 10.78%. Mr. Magee has not shown that this market return is sustainable over the long run. Mr. Magee's market return

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Q:

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exceeds both the historical geometric and arithmetic mean compounded total annual return for the period between 1926 and 2015 and contradicts

Dr. Ibbotson's and Dr. Chen's supply-side long-run estimated market return model.

Do you agree with Mr. Magee's calculation of his projected risk-free rate of

return and his current risk-free rate of return used in his CAPM MRP?

Mr. Magee's current risk-free estimate focuses on interest rates over a shorter time-frame and only relies on a single current spot yield which is assumed to be outstanding into perpetuity. In contrast, I relied on 80 years of historical data of 20-year Treasury bond returns to reflect the long-life nature of an asset such as common equity. Longer-term total market return reflects the true expected risk-free rate, since it reflects market changes and total return expectation.

Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that most interest rate forecasts published by Blue Chip, IHS, and EIA have been overstated. There has been a consensus that yields on long-term treasuries will increase due to "normalized" monetary policy. However, this has not occurred since the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FED) began its accommodative monetary policy in 2011. Relying on projected interest and interest rates forecasts will continue to overstate the risk free rate as they have done over the past 5 years.

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- Q: Explain in more detail your concern with Mr. Magee's calculated MRP using arithmetic averages as opposed to geometric averages.
- A: My concern is that arithmetic averages distort returns realized over a historical period. This occurs because equity returns are not normally distributed. If returns were normally distributed and independent, the mean and the variance would completely describe the distribution of stock returns. Stock returns, however, are not normally distributed or independent. Stock returns have "fatter tails" than a normal bell shaped distribution. A study highlighted the difference between actual "fat tails" distribution of stock returns and the assumed normal bell curve distribution. This study estimated stock returns averaging about 9.5% (excluding dividends).³ However, if the 50 worst days were excluded (less than 1.0% of the observations in the study), returns soar to 18.2%. Similarly, if we excluded the best 50 days, returns would only be a mere 1.0% over this same period. These actual returns were compared to stock returns assuming a normal bell shape distribution. The contrast is depicted in the Table I.

³ "The Wisdom and Whims of the Collective" Michael J. Mauboussin, CFA Institute, December 2007, pp. 1–7.

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Table I

A:

	Actual Distribution	Assumed Normal
Distribution		
Returns	9.5%	9.5%
Excluding Worst 50 Days	18.2	15.2
Excluding Best 50 Days	1.0	3.5

In short, a few good or bad days have disproportionate influence and underscore the fact that taking into account actual "fat tailed" returns affect results dramatically. Since stock returns are not normally distributed as assumed by Mr. Magee, the arithmetic mean as an indicator of expected returns is not reliable.

The use of the arithmetic mean also assumes that stock returns are independent of each other. This assumption is, at best, more of a convenience to researchers than definitively established. Almost all assets have positive correlations.

Q: Should Mr. Magee rely on the historical Risk Premium Model and its corresponding adjustment?

No. Mr. Magee asserts that a further adjustment to the risk premium is necessary because the historical equity risk premium is not constant and inversely related to interest rate. To address the resulting distortion of the risk premium with varying interest rates, Mr. Magee calculates an equity risk premium adjustment that compares the changes in risk premium with the

A:

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changes in interest rates over time. Mr. Magee calculates risk premium using the difference between historical 26-year allowed ROEs and the average yield of Moody's Baa rated-public utility bonds.

I disagree with Mr. Magee's conclusion that the risk premium changes by 58 basis points for every one percent change in bond yield. Mr. Magee bases his calculation on a spurious relationship between both the dependent variable (risk premium) and independent variable (average utility bond yield). However, there is also a high relationship between a third independent variable (assumed ROE) and risk premium. Both ROE and the risk premium are a function of interest rates. By omitting the also high relationship between ROE and risk premium, Mr. Magee's regression analysis erroneously produces a coefficient that appears to be entirely explained by the relationship between risk premium and interest rates.

Q: Do you agree with Mr. Magee's size premium adjustment?

No. I believe these adjustments are unwarranted, speculative, and at best, an attempt to arbitrarily inflate the ROE for Liberty at the expense of its ratepayers.

First, even if there was any merit in the data that supports the size effect, most of the size effect studies were not done for the utility industry. The studies that point out the shortcomings of valuation models that demonstrate the size effect were not performed for utility stock. Dr. A. Wong published a study

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titled, "Utility Stocks and the Size Effect: An Empirical Analysis" in which he concluded that:

After controlling for equity values, there is some weak evidence that firm size is a missing factor from the CAPM for the industrial but not for utility stocks.

Second, it is not clear that if the size phenomenon existed, the size premium should be applied automatically. In fact, Dr. Roger Morin, author and expert witness, has acknowledged that size effect may be a "statistical mirage, whereby size is proxy for the effect of different economic variables [.]", and it is "most likely the result of a liquidity premium" due to "lack of marketability and liquidity". ⁴

Third, the size effect has been variable over time. It appears that the size phenomenon appeared in the period of 1926-1983. During this period, it appears that smaller companies outperformed larger companies in terms of realized return. However, analysts conclude that when we look at the data from 1984 on, larger companies' realized return outperformed those of smaller companies.⁵

Fourth, the effects that could possibly explain the size phenomenon are not germane to Liberty because Liberty is not a stand-alone utility. Liberty is a subsidiary of large holding structure. Liberty relies on LUCO and Algonquin to

⁴ Morin, Rogers A. "New Regulatory Finance," *Public Utilities Report, Inc.* June 2006, page 49.

⁵ Dimson, Marsh, Staunton, *Triumph of the Optimists: 101 Years of Global Investment Returns*, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 2002, and Block, S. B. "A Study of Financial Analysts: Practice and Theory," Association for Investment Management and Research, July/August 1999.

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acquire relatively low cost capital. Liberty does not issue any debt of its own and its ability to acquire capital depends on the credit strength of both parents.

The Board has previously rejected the size adjustment requests noting that there was no persuasive evidence to persuade the Board to isolate individual factors to adjust the ROE.⁶

- Q: Does this conclude your direct testimony?
- 7 A: Yes.

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NOTE: Confidential material has been identified by placing it between curly brackets { }.

⁶ *In re: Iowa-American Water Company*, Docket No. RPU-2013-0002, Final Order (Feb. 28, 2014), page 18.

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STATE OF IOWA)) SS: AFFIDAVIT OF MARCOS MUNOZ
COUNTY OF POLK) SS. AFFIDAVII OF MARCOS MUNOZ
I, Marcos Munoz, bo	eing first duly sworn on oath, depose and state that I am the same
Marcos Munoz identified in	the foregoing Direct Testimony; that I have caused the foregoing
Direct Testimony to be prep	pared and am familiar with the contents thereof, and that the
foregoing Direct Testimony	as identified therein is true and correct to the best of my knowledge
information and belief as of	the date of this Affidavit.
	/s/ Marcos Munoz
	Marcos Munoz
Subscribed and sworn to be day of November, 2016.	fore me, A Notary Public, in and for said County and State, this 7 th
/s/ Craig Graziano	
Notary Public	
My Commission expires: J	une 14, 2017

PUBLIC

OFFICE OF CONSUMER ADVOCATE

DIRECT EXHIBIT SCHEDULES A - F

OF

MARCOS MUNOZ

IN RE: LIBERTY UTILITIES (MIDSTATES NATURAL GAS) CORP. d/b/a LIBERTY UTILITIES

DOCKET NO. RPU-2016-0003

Filed with the Iowa Utilities Board on November 7, 2016, RPU-2016-0003

Index of Direct Exhibit, Schedules A-F Marcos Munoz RPU-2016-0003

Schedule	<u>Subject</u>	<u>PDF</u>	Excel
A	Capital Structure	✓	✓
В	Proxy Group Sample	✓	✓
C	Proxy Group DCF Calculations	✓	✓
D	CAPM ROE	✓	✓
E	Risk Premium Ranges	✓	✓
F	Response to OCA Data Request No. 17	✓	

OCA Exhibit Munoz Direct Schedule A Page 1 of 3 RPU-2016-0003

Liberty Utilities (Midstates Natural Gas)

	(A)	Ratio (B)	Cost (C)	Weighted <u>Cost</u> (D)
1	Long-term Debt	53%	4.830%	2.560%
2	Preferred Stock	0%	0.000%	0.000%
3	Common Equity	<u>47%</u>	9.200%	4.324%
4	Total	100%		6.884%

Source: Line 1, column (C), Munoz-Direct Workpapers Schedule A (cost of capital support)

Public
OCA Exhibit Munoz Direct
Schedule A
Page 2 of 3
RPU-2016-0003

CONFIDENTIAL

Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp.

	(A)	Amount (B)	Ratio (C)
1	Long-term Debt		
2	Preferred Equity		
3	Common Equity		
4	Total		


Liberty Utilities Corporation (LUCO)

	(A)	Amount (B)	Ratio (C)
5	Long-term Debt		
6	Preferred Stock		
7	Common Equity		
8	Total		


Source: Munoz-Direct Workpapers Schedule A (cost of capital support).xls

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OCA Exhibit Munoz Direct
Schedule A
Page 3 of 3
RPU-2016-0003
(E)

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Source: Munoz-Direct Workpapers Schedule A (cost of capital support)



Source: Munoz-Direct Workpapers Schedule A (cost of capital support)

LUCO's Effective Weighted Cost of Capital



Source: Munoz-Direct Workpapers Schedule A (cost of capital support)


Filed with the Iowa Utilities Board on November 7, 2016, RPU-2016-0003

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Natural Gas Utilities Sample

				Earnings		Market	Market to
		Common		Ratio	Ca	apitalization	Book Ratio
		Equity Ratio	Beta	P/E		(in billion)	P/B
Atmos Energy Corporation	ATO	56.5%	0.75	17.50	\$	7.80	2.3
Spire Inc	SR	47.0%	0.70	16.50	\$	3.00	1.6
New Jersey Resources Corporation	NJR	56.8%	0.80	16.60	\$	3.00	2.2
Northwest Natural Gas Company	NWN	57.5%	0.65	23.70	\$	1.70	2.1
South Jersey Industries, Inc.	SJI	50.8%	0.80	17.90	\$	2.40	1.8
Southwest Gas	SWX	50.7%	0.75	19.40	\$	3.40	2.0
WGL Holdings, Inc.	WGL	56.1%	0.75	17.00	\$	3.30	2.3
Arithmetic Average		53.6%	0.74	18.37		3.514	2.0
Median		56.1%	0.75	17.50		3.000	2.1
Sample High		57.5%	0.80	23.70		7.800	2.3
Sample Low		47.0%	0.65	16.50		1.700	1.6

Data is primarily Value Line Investment Survey sheets. M/B ratio is from Yahoo Finance 9/5/2016



.42 (A) Fiscal year ends Sept. 30th. (B) Diluted shrs. Excl. nonrec. items: '06, d18¢; '07, d2¢; '(C) Dividends historically paid in early March, '09, 12¢; '10, 5¢; '11, (1¢). Excludes discontin-June, Sept., and Dec. ■ Div. reinvestment plan. ued operations: '11, 10¢; '12, 27¢; '13, 14¢. Direct stock purchase plan avail.

EARNINGS PER SHARE

Jun.30

.36

.45

69

.68

.345

.35

.37

.39

.42

Mar.31

1.23

1.38

1.35

1.38

1.47

.345

.35

.37

.39

QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID C=

Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Dec.31

Dec.31

.85

.95

1.00

1.06

.345

.35

.37

.39

.42

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

endar

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

ABE

Sep.30

.08

.23

.28

.34

.35 .37

.42

2.50

2.96

3.09

3.35

3.55

Year

1.39

1.42

1.59

erating margins expand further.

Activity has been brisk on the rate-filing front. Through the first nine months of fiscal 2016, Atmos was able to

finish 15 rate-case proceedings, resulting in a \$63.7 million rise in annual operating

income. What's more, a few ratemaking ef

forts are in progress seeking \$24.5 million

of annual operating income. But there are no guarantees that the company will re-

Atmos' prospects out to 2019-2021. It is

ceive everything it wants.

Value Line is constructive

(D) In millions. (E) Qtrs may not add due to change in shrs outstanding.

about

Company's Financial Strength Stock's Price Stability Price Growth Persistence Earnings Predictability

point over the past few months. It ap-

pears that move can be traced partly to

the energy firm's decent earnings in fiscal

2016. Consequently, these shares possess

a 2 (Above Average) rank for Timeliness.

Other positives include the healthy level of

current dividend income (plus prospects of

additional hikes in the well-covered pay-

out), the 1 (Highest) Safety rank, and ex-


cellent score for Price Stability. In all, a broad range of investors ought to find

Frederick L. Harris, III September 2, 2016

something to like here

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733.7 3198.1 591.9 3738.2 388.3 1800 2250 Sep.30 d.01 d.23 2.08 d.06 1.78 d.02 1.60 1.80 .01 QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID C = Full This was modestly below our earlier call of Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Dec.31 \$0.15, but still represented a healthy im-.97 .20 .23 .86 .93

customers during the first nine months of the year. Despite this increase in active customer meters, the downturn in natural gas prices resulted in that segment posting reduced top-line contributions. Meanwhile, on the profitability front, total operating expenses increased 520 basis points as a percentage of revenues. On the upside, other income and an income tax benefit helped to boost the bottom line. After excluding unrealized losses on derivatives NJR's third-quarter earnings rose more than threefold, to \$0.13 a share.

provement over 2015's easy comparison. That said, we have left our 2016 and 2017 earnings estimates unchanged at \$1.60 and \$1.80, respectively. The NJNG regulated utility division

longer time frame, an active capital growth project program will likely take

some time to bear fruit.

Bryan J. Fong

These shares have improved notch in Timeliness, to 2 (Above Average). This suggests NJR will outpace the broader market averages in the coming year and may appeal to momentum accounts. However, the stock's quotation is trading above our Target Price Range, making it an unsuitable choice for the long term. From a fundamental standpoint, it is also trading at a somewhat rich price-toearnings multiple, especially for a utility. Finally, when compared to other stocks in this industry, New Jersey Resources' dividend yield is a bit light. As a result, we think these shares are best-suited for short-term investors.

(A) Fiscal year ends Sept. 30th.
(B) Diluted earnings. Qtly egs may not sum to total due to change in shares outstanding. Next earnings report due late Oct.

960.9

1579.6

1013.1

690

Dec.31 Mar.31

574.2

1.79

1.16

.91

.96

.19

.20

.21

.24

767.5

688.3

458.5

393.2

500

510

Jun.30

.05

.03

.13

.20

.19

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.21 .23 .24

EARNINGS PER SHARE AB

736.0

878.4

824.1

444.3

.47

.65

.58

.63

.19

.21 .23

.24

550 2017

2014

2016

Year Ends

2014

2015

2016

2017

Cal-

endar

2012

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2015


2016

(C) Dividends historically paid in early Jan., April, July, and October. 1Q '13 div'd paid in 4Q '12. ■ Dividend reinvestment plan available (D) Includes regulatory assets in 2015: \$410.2

million, \$4.82/share (E) In millions, adjusted for splits. Company's Financial Strength Stock's Price Stability Price Growth Persistence 85 60 Earnings Predictability

September 2, 2016

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
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(C) In millions.

Next earnings report due in early November.

Earnings Predictability

25 90



ANNUAL RATES | Past | Past | Est'd '13-'15 |
of change (per sh) | 10 Yrs. | 5 Yrs. | to '19-'21 |
Revenues | -1.5% | 6.0% | 2.5% |
Earnings | 7.0% | 4.0% | 3.0% |
Dividends | 9.0% | 8.5% | 6.5% |
Book Value | 8.0% | 8.5% | 8.0% |
Cal- | QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.) | Full

endar	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31	Year
2013	255.6	122.6	128.8	224.4	731.4
2014	350.2	133.3	122.4	281.1	887.0
2015	383.0	177.7	141.1	257.8	959.6
2016	333.0	154.4	150	287.6	925
2017	350	170	160	320	1000
Cal-	EA	RNINGS P	ER SHARI	Α	Full
endar	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31	Year
2013	.76	.16	d.02	.62	1.52
2014	1.01	.15	d.05	.47	1.57
2015	.86	.03	d.07	.62	1.44
2016	.80	.12	d.10	.50	1.32
2017	.80	.10	d.06	.56	1.40
Cal-	QUAR	TERLY DIV	IDENDS P	AID B=	Full
endar	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31	Year
2012		.202	.202	.423	.83
2013		.222	.222	.458	.90
2014		.237	.237	.488	.96
2015		.251	.251	.515	1.02
2016		.264	.264		

Shares of South Jersey Industries have come off an all-time high price lately. The company reported mixed results for the second quarter. The top line declined roughly 13%, on a year-over-year basis. The bottom-line picture was more favorable, with earnings per share of \$0.12 advancing considerably from the prior-year period. This was largely due to improved operating performance at the energy production business, South Jersey Energy Services. Modest customer growth supported results at mainstay utility South Jersey Gas.

We expect unfavorable bottom-line comparisons in the third and fourth quarters, and lower earnings per share for the current year. A reduction in solar investments ought to produce a much lower contribution to earnings from investment tax credits going forward. On the bright side, we do envision healthy bottom-line improvement from 2017 onward. The addition of several fuel supply management contracts ought to benefit performance at the wholesale and retail commodity business, South Jersey Energy Group. The Energy Services division will

likely perform well, too, and the company's interest in the PennEast pipeline should contribute to earnings growth. Elsewhere, prospects for the utility look fairly attractive. Natural gas remains the fuel of choice within its service territory. This business will probably continue to benefit from customer conversions to natural gas, considering its cost effectiveness compared with alternatives. Customer additions and significant infrastructure investment ought to drive earnings growth over the long haul.

This stock is ranked to outperform the broader market averages for the coming six to 12 months. Moreover, we envision healthy operating improvement for the company over the pull to late decade. However, the pluses look to be largely reflected in the recent quotation, and appreciation potential appears fairly limited for the pull to 2019-2021. Even so, income-seeking accounts may find the stock's healthy dividend yield attractive. Also, South Jersey earns high marks for Safety, Financial Strength, Price Stability, and Earnings Predictability.


Michael Napoli, CFA September 2, 2016

(A) Based on GAAP egs. through 2006, economic egs. thereafter. GAAP EPS: '07, \$1.05, '08, \$1.29, '09, \$0.97, '10, \$1.11, '11, \$1.49, '12, \$1.49, '13, \$1.28, '14, \$1.46, '15, \$1.52

Excl. nonrecur. gain (loss): '01, \$0.07; '08, \$0.16; '09, (\$0.22); '10, (\$0.24); '11, \$0.04; '12, (\$0.03); '13, (\$0.24); '14, (\$0.11); '15, \$0.08. Egs. may not sum due to rounding. Next egs.

report due early Nov. (B) Div'ds paid early April, July, Oct., and late Dec. ■ Div. reinvest. plan avail. (C) Incl. reg. assets. In 2015: \$521.0 mill., \$7.34 per shr. (D) In mill., adj. for split.

Company's Financial Strength A Stock's Price Stability 90 Price Growth Persistence 40 Earnings Predictability 80



by higher volumes. Too, gas and market-ing income retreated year over year. This led earnings per share to fall to \$0.24. As we expect a higher share count and depressed commodity costs to weigh on fiscal fourth-quarter results. we have trimmed our fiscal 2016 full-year earnings-

per-share estimate by \$0.15, to \$3.25. The regulatory environment is caus ing some near-term concerns. The Office of Public Council has questioned the return on equity and the impact of Spire's pending acquisition of two gas utilities (more below) on Missouri customers. A customer negative outcome could cause givebacks. Meantime, Spire will file new rate cases for its Missouri Gas and Laclede Gas subsidiaries in April of 2017. These efforts should impact profitability.

The acquisitions of Mobile Gas and

Willmut Gas appear to be on track. Spire will pay \$344 million in order to gain the customer bases in Alabama and Mississippi; the deal is set to close by calendar

fiscal 2018, with cost synergies driving further gains thereafter.

Infrastructure builds should improve long-term earnings. The company has made progress on its Spire STL pipeline, which ought to lower distribution costs of natural gas and have higher allowable returns on equity. Infrastructure expenditures are expected to be above \$1.8 billion over the next five years. With infrastructure replacement surcharges built into Spire should benefit service contracts. from better reliability

Shares of Spire offer decent current income. An Above-Average Safety rank (2) adds appeal. Yet, although the yield is better than the industry mean, total return potential is limited, given that the shares are trading within our long-term Target Price Range. Most investors would do best waiting for a dip in price.

September 2, 2016 John E. Seibert III

.49 .49 (A) Fiscal year ends Sept. 30th. (B) Based on diluted shares outstanding. Excludes nonrecurring loss: '06, 7¢. Excludes gain from discontinued operations: '08, 94¢. Next earnings report | Incl. deferred charges. In '14: \$383.8 mill.,

Cash Flow

Dividends Book Value

307.0

468.6

619.6

399 4

Dec.31

1.09

1.09

1.08

.425

.44

.46

.49

475

Earnings

2014

2015

2016

2017

Fiscal Year Ends

2013

2014

2015

2016

Cal-

endar

2012

2013 2014

2015

2016

4.0%

3.0%

2.5% 7.5%

QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.)A

Dec.31 Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30

EARNINGS PER SHARE ABF

QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID C =

Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Dec.31

165.3

241.8

275.2

249.3

Jun.30

.33

.415

.425

.44

.46

250

397.6

694.5

877.4

609.3

775

Mar.31

1.59

2.18

2.30

.415

425

.44

.46

3.0% 8.0%

147.1

2223

204.2

342

400

Sep.30

d.30

d.35

d.43

d.38

.415

.425

.44

.46

9.5%

9.0%

1017.0

1627.2

1976.4

1650

1900

Full

2.02

2.35

3.16

3.25

Full

Year

1.66


1.70

1.76

1.84

due late October. (C) Dividends historically paid in early January, April, July, and October.

Dividend reinvestment plan available. (D) \$8.85/sh. (E) In millions. (F) Qtly. egs. may not sum due to rounding or change in shares outCompany's Financial Strength Stock's Price Stability Price Growth Persistence 100 Earnings Predictability 85



Cal-	QUARI	Full			
endar	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31	Year
2013	613.5	411.6	387.3	538.4	1950.8
2014	608.4	453.2	432.5	627.7	2121.7
2015	734.2	538.6	505.4	685.4	2463.6
2016	731.2	547.7	520	701.1	2500
2017	765	575	545	725	2610
Cal-	EAF	RNINGS PE	R SHARE	A D	Full
endar	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31	Year
2013	1.73	.22	d.06	1.22	3.11
2014	1.51	.21	.04	1.25	3.01
2015	1.53	.10	d.10	1.38	2.92
2016	1.58	.19	d.05	1.38	3.10
2017	1.68	.22	.05	1.50	3.45
Cal-	QUAR1	ERLY DIV	IDENDS PA	\ID B = †	Full
endar	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31	Year
2012	.265	.295	.295	.295	1.15
2013	.295	.330	.330	.330	1.29
2014	.330	.365	.365	.365	1.43
2015	.365	.405	.405	.405	1.58
2016	.405	.450	.450		

Shares of Southwest Gas have continued to advance in price over the past three months. We think a fall in bond yields has prompted investors to favor good dividend-paying stocks. Meanwhile, the company reported considerable bottom-line improvement on modest revenue growth for the recent interim. The natural gas utility benefited from rate relief and modest growth in the customer base. Meanwhile, construction services line Centuri continued to grow its existing business and expand into new markets.

Southwest Gas has received approval

from regulators to reorganize as a holding company. Subject to consent from various third parties and the final approval from the board, the reorganization could become effective as early as the December quarter. This will provide further separation between the regulated and unregulated businesses, and additional financing flexibility.

The natural gas business should further benefit from several factors. Customer growth, infrastructure tracker mechanisms, and expansion projects will probably continue to support performance.

Operations and maintenance expense ought to increase modestly, but this should be offset by lower pension costs. Capital expenditures of about \$460 million for 2016 should support system improvements, a larger customer base, and pipeline replacement programs.

Centuri should post good results. This

Centuri should post good results. This business has a strong base of large utility clients to sustain and grow its operation. Many of these are multiyear pipe replacement programs. Revenue ought to be 7% to 10% higher this year. The long-term fundamentals look sound, given the need to replace aging infrastructure.


This stock is timely. Moreover, we expect healthy growth for the company out to 2019-2021. But this appears to be largely reflected in the recent share price, as the stock is trading well within our Target Price Range. The dividend yield is somewhat below average for a utility, too. But Southwest Gas earns good marks for Price Stability, Growth Persistence, and Earnings Predictability. Still, this equity appears most appropriate for momentum-oriented accounts.

Michael Napoli, CFA September 2, 2016

(A) Diluted earnings. Excl. nonrec. gains (losses): '02, (10¢); '05, (11¢); '06, 7¢. Next egs. report due early November. (B) Dividends historically paid early March, June, September,

and December. •† Div'd reinvestment and stock purchase plan avail. (C) In millions. (D) Totals may not sum due to rounding.

Company's Financial Strength
Stock's Price Stability
Price Growth Persistence
Earnings Predictability
90
80



underground gas-storage facility in WV. Non-regulated subs.: Wash. Gas Energy Svcs. sells and delivers natural gas and pro-

lister, Inc.: D.C. and VA. Addr.: 101 Const. Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20080. Tel.: 202-624-6410. Internet: www.walholdings.com.

Fix. Chg. Cov 535% 535% 535% **ANNUAL RATES** Past Est'd '13-'15 5 Yrs. to '19-'21 10 Yrs. of change (per sh) 5 Yrs. 0.5% 3.5% 3.5% Revenues "Cash Flow" 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% Earnings Dividends Book Value

1020.3

Current Liab.

982.9

994.9

Fiscal Year Ends	QUART Dec.31	ERLY REV Mar.31	/ENUES (\$ Jun.30	mill.) ^A Sep.30	Full Fiscal Year
2013	686.7	891.4	478.1	409.9	2466.1
2014	680.5	1174.0	467.5	458.9	2780.9
2015	749.2	1001.7	441.2	467.7	2659.8
2016	613.4	835.7	440.6	485.3	2375
2017	695	915	520	570	2700
Fiscal	EAF	RNINGS PE	R SHARE	AB	<u>F</u> ull
Year Ends	Dec.31	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Fiscal Year
2013	1.14	1.75	d.03	d.55	2.31
2014	.99	1.84	.02	d.17	2.68
2015	1.16	2.02	.22	d.23	3.16
2016	1.18	1.78	.33	d.19	3.10
2017	1.23	1.83	.38	d.14	3.30
Cal-	QUAR	TERLY DIV	IDENDS P	VID c ■	Full
endar	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31	Year
2012	.39	.40	.40	.40	1.59
2013	.40	.42	.42	.42	1.66
2014	.42	.44	.44	.44	1.74
2015	.44	.463	.463	.463	
2016	.463	.488	.488		

WGL Holdings logged mixed financial results for the June quarter. Revenues receded modestly. This reflected an almost 2% drop in utility volumes, partially offset by a 1.2% rise in the nonutility business. However, we view the apparent weakness in the regulated utility business as more of a technicality, owing to the year-over-year decline in natural gas prices. On the margin front, operating expenses fell 710 basis points as a percentage of the top line. After accounting for rising earnings from unconsolidated affiliates and reduced interest costs, the bottom line increased 50%, to \$0.33 a share. This handily beat our earlier call of \$0.21.

Consequently, we have raised our fis-cal 2016 and 2017 (ends September 30th) share-net estimates by a dime each, to \$3.10 and \$3.30, respectively. In the current year, this would still represent a moderate earnings shortfall of almost 2%. The top line is anticipated to decline more than 10% this year due to sustained pressure on natural gas prices as well as a general slowdown in natural gas consumption patterns in WGL's primary service territory. On the upside, the

company continues to add new customer accounts. Over the past 12 months, the regulated utility division added about 12,100 active meters. The Commercial Energy Systems and Midstream Energy Services units have been nicely complementary this year. Finally, recently filed rate cases in Virginia and the District of Columbia augur well for recouping costs associated with WGL's infrastructure program.

The Constitution Pipeline has been delayed. Management believes the venture could be in service in the second half of 2018. WGL has a 10% stake in that pipeline. Unfortunately, the decision by the NY State Department of Environmental Conservation to deny the water quality certificate is adding uncertainty here.

The balance sheet is in good shape. Although long-term debt advanced a bit more than 25%, it still represents a pretty standard percentage of total capital for a utility. Finances are solid enough to support the decent dividend.

These shares are timely. But the run-up in price over the past two years places WGL above our Target Price Range. September 2, 2016 Bryan J. Fong

(A) Fiscal years end Sept. 30th.
(B) Based on diluted shares. Excludes non-recurring losses: '01, (13¢); '02, (34¢); '07, (4¢); '08, (14¢) discontinued operations: '06,

(15¢). Qtly egs. may not sum to total, due to ber. ■ Dividend reinvestment plan available. change in shares outstanding. Next earnings report due late Oct. (C) Dividends historically 15: \$705.8 million, \$14.18/sh. paid early February, May, August, and Novem- | (E) In millions.

Company's Financial Strength Stock's Price Stability Price Growth Persistence 90 75 Earnings Predictability

Filed with the Iowa Utilities Board on November 7, 2016, RPU-2016-0003

OCA Exhibit Munoz Direct Schedule C Page 1 of 9 RPU-2016-0003

Table I Liberty Utilities (Midstates)

(a)	(b)		(c)	Ann	(d) nualized	(e)	(f)	(g)
Company	Symbol]	<u>Price</u>	Ind	licated vidend	Dividend <u>Yield</u>	Growth Rate	<u>DCF</u>
1 Atmos Energy Corporation	ATO	\$	67.13	\$	1.68	2.50%	4.3%	6.8%
2 Spire Inc	SR	\$	61.40	\$	1.96	3.19%	6.0%	9.2%
3 New Jersey Resources Corporation	NJR	\$	33.25	\$	0.96	2.89%	7.0%	9.9%
4 Northwest Natural Gas Company	NWN	\$	51.75	\$	1.87	3.61%	2.5%	6.2%
5 South Jersey Industries, Inc.	SJI	\$	26.38	\$	1.06	4.00%	7.9%	11.9%
6 Southwest Gas	SWX	\$	62.34	\$	1.80	2.89%	7.0%	9.9%
7 WGL Holdings, Inc.	WGL	\$	64.07	\$	1.95	3.05%	3.2%	6.3%
			Arithn	netic A	Average	3.2%	5.4%	8.6%
					Median	3.0%	6.0%	9.2%
				Ma	aximum		7.9%	11.9%
				M	inimum		2.5%	6.2%

Source:

Closing prices are from Yahoo Finance (9-5-16). Details of the price and dividend yield calculation can be found in my electronic workpapers, Munoz Direct Workpaper, tab "Wkp Price".

Quarterly dividends are from Value Line 2016 3rd Quarter Issue.

Growth rates are based primarily on the data found in this Exhibit in Schedule C, page 2.

Filed with the Iowa Utilities Board on November 7, 2016, RPU-2016-0003

OCA Exhibit Munoz Direct Schedule C Page 2 of 9 RPU-2016-0003

	<u>ATO</u>	<u>SR</u>	<u>NJR</u>	<u>NWN</u>	<u>SJI</u>	<u>SWX</u>	<u>WGL</u>
Five Year Growth Rates							
Earnings per Share	7.0%	-1.0%	6.5%	-5.0%	4.0%	10.0%	2.5%
Dividend per Share	2.5%	3.0%	7.0%	3.0%	9.5%	9.0%	3.5%
Book Value per Share	5.0%	8.0%	6.5%	2.5%	8.5%	5.5%	2.5%
Ten Year Growth Rates							
Earnings per Share	5.5%	3.0%	7.5%	1.0%	7.0%	8.5%	2.5%
Dividend per Share	2.0%	2.5%	7.0%	3.5%	9.0%	6.0%	3.0%
Book Value per Share	5.0%	7.5%	8.0%	3.0%	8.0%	5.5%	4.0%
Median Internal Growth Rates							
Recent Retention Growth	4.1%	11.4%	6.7%	1.8%	9.1%	5.8%	3.7%
Ten Year Retention Growth	3.4%	6.5%	6.7%	2.9%	8.2%	5.5%	4.2%
Arithmetic Average	4.3%	6.0%	7.0%	2.5%	7.9%	7.0%	3.2%
Median	4.6%	6.5%	6.9%	2.9%	8.4%	5.9%	3.3%

Growth rates are based primarily on the data found on Value Line Investment Survey, Q1 2016. Internal growth rates are from Schedule C, pages 3 to 9. Highlighted Values are not included in the average and median calculation.

OCA Exhibit Munoz Direct Schedule C Page 3 of 9 RPU-2016-0003

Table I Atmos Energy Corporation Financial Data & Calculations

	Earnings	Dividends	Average Book Value	Average Return on Common	Dividend Payout	Earnings Retention	Internal Growth
	per	per	per	Equity	Ratio	Ratio	Rate
Years	<u>Share</u>	Share	<u>Share</u>	<u>"r"</u>	<u>(1-b)</u>	<u>''b''</u>	<u>''br''</u>
2007	\$1.94	\$1.28	\$21.09	9.201%	65.979%	34.021%	3.130%
2008	\$2.00	\$1.30	\$22.31	8.967%	65.000%	35.000%	3.660%
2009	\$1.97	\$1.32	\$23.06	8.543%	67.005%	32.995%	2.985%
2010	\$2.16	\$1.34	\$23.84	9.060%	62.037%	37.963%	3.364%
2011	\$2.26	\$1.36	\$24.57	9.198%	60.177%	39.823%	3.288%
2012	\$2.10	\$1.38	\$25.56	8.216%	65.714%	34.286%	2.831%
2013	\$2.50	\$1.40	\$27.31	9.156%	56.000%	44.000%	4.124%
2014	\$2.96	\$1.48	\$29.61	9.998%	50.000%	50.000%	9.092%
2015	\$3.09	\$1.56	\$31.11	9.932%	50.485%	49.515%	9.786%
	Recent Fi	ve Year Arithn	netic Average	9.3%	56.5%	43.5%	5.8%
		Recent Five	Year Median	9.2%	56.0%	44.0%	4.1%
	Ni	ne Year Arithn	netic Average	9.1%	60.3%	39.7%	4.7%
		Nine	Year Median	9.2%	62.0%	38.0%	3.4%

OCA Exhibit Munoz Direct Schedule C Page 4 of 9 RPU-2016-0003

Table I Spire Inc. Financial Data & Calculations

		, u10 u1u1	711 0		Average	Average			
					Book	Return	Dividend	Earnings	Internal
	Ea	rnings	Div	idends	Value	on Common	Payout	Retention	Growth
		per		per	per	Equity	Ratio	Ratio	Rate
Years	<u>S</u>	<u>hare</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>hare</u>	Share	<u>''r''</u>	<u>(1-b)</u>	<u>"b"</u>	<u>"br"</u>
2001	\$	1.61	\$	1.34	\$15.13	10.645%	83.230%	16.770%	1.785%
2002	\$	1.18	\$	1.34	\$15.17	7.781%	113.559%	-13.559%	-1.055%
2003	\$	1.82	\$	1.34	\$15.36	11.849%	73.626%	26.374%	3.125%
2004	\$	1.82	\$	1.35	\$16.31	11.162%	74.176%	25.824%	2.883%
2005	\$	1.90	\$	1.37	\$17.14	11.088%	72.105%	27.895%	7.131%
2006	\$	2.37	\$	1.40	\$18.08	13.108%	59.072%	40.928%	6.124%
2007	\$	2.31	\$	1.45	\$19.32	11.957%	62.771%	37.229%	5.215%
2008	\$	2.64	\$	1.49	\$20.96	12.598%	56.439%	43.561%	7.088%
2009	\$	2.92	\$	1.53	\$22.72	12.852%	52.397%	47.603%	6.961%
2010	\$	2.43	\$	1.57	\$23.67	10.266%	64.609%	35.391%	3.938%
2011	\$	2.86	\$	1.61	\$24.79	11.537%	56.294%	43.706%	5.350%
2012	\$	2.79	\$	1.66	\$26.12	10.684%	59.498%	40.502%	4.642%
2013	\$	2.02	\$	1.70	\$29.34	6.886%	84.158%	15.842%	11.688%
2014	\$	2.35	\$	1.76	\$33.47	7.022%	74.894%	25.106%	19.766%
2015	\$	3.16	\$	1.84	\$35.62	8.873%	58.228%	41.772%	11.373%
	R	ecent Fiv	ve Ye	ar Arithm	netic Average	9.0%	66.6%	33.4%	10.6%
			Rec	cent Five	Year Median	8.9%	59.5%	40.5%	11.4%
		Te	en Ye	ar Arithm	netic Average	10.6%	62.8%	37.2%	8.2%
				Ten '	Year Median	11.1%	59.3%	40.7%	6.5%

OCA Exhibit Munoz Direct Schedule C Page 5 of 9 RPU-2016-0003

Table I New Jersey Resources Financial Data & Calculations

	Earnings per	Dividends per	Average Book Value per	Average Return on Common Equity	Dividend Payout Ratio	Earnings Retention Ratio	Internal Growth Rate
Years	Share	Share	Share	<u>''r''</u>	<u>(1-b)</u>	<u>''b''</u>	<u>''br''</u>
2001	0.65	0.39	\$4.27	15.222%	60.000%	40.000%	6.089%
2002	0.7	0.4	\$4.38	16.000%	57.143%	42.857%	6.857%
2003	0.79	0.41	\$4.74	16.667%	51.899%	48.101%	8.017%
2004	0.85	0.43	\$5.38	15.814%	50.588%	49.412%	7.814%
2005	0.88	0.45	\$5.46	16.117%	51.136%	48.864%	8.866%
2006	0.93	0.48	\$6.40	14.531%	51.613%	48.387%	6.731%
2007	0.78	0.51	\$7.63	10.230%	65.385%	34.615%	3.970%
2008	1.35	0.56	\$8.20	16.473%	41.481%	58.519%	10.386%
2009	1.2	0.62	\$8.47	14.176%	51.667%	48.333%	6.818%
2010	1.23	0.68	\$8.55	14.386%	55.285%	44.715%	5.082%
2011	1.29	0.72	\$9.09	14.199%	55.814%	44.186%	6.024%
2012	1.36	0.77	\$9.58	14.196%	56.618%	43.382%	6.714%
2013	1.37	0.81	\$10.23	13.399%	59.124%	40.876%	5.766%
2014	2.08	0.86	\$11.07	18.798%	41.346%	58.654%	12.014%
2015	1.78	0.93	\$12.24	14.548%	52.247%	47.753%	8.591%
	Recent Fi	ve Year Arithn	U	15.0%	53.0%	47.0%	7.8%
		Recent Five	Year Median	14.2%	55.8%	44.2%	6.7%
	To	en Year Arithn	U		53.1%	46.9%	7.2%
		Ten	Year Median	14.3%	53.8%	46.2%	6.7%

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Table I Northwest Natural Gas Financial Data & Calculations

		rnings per		idends per	Average Book Value per	Average Return on Common Equity	Dividend Payout Ratio	Earnings Retention Ratio	Internal Growth Rate
Years	<u>S</u>	<u>hare</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>hare</u>	Share	<u>"r"</u>	<u>(1-b)</u>	<u>"b"</u>	<u>"br"</u>
2001	\$	1.88	\$	1.25	\$18.25	10.304%	66.489%	33.511%	3.453%
2002	\$	1.62	\$	1.26	\$18.72	8.654%	77.778%	22.222%	1.210%
2003	\$	1.76	\$	1.27	\$19.20	9.167%	72.159%	27.841%	1.155%
2004	\$	1.86	\$	1.30	\$20.08	9.263%	69.892%	30.108%	-1.015%
2005	\$	2.11	\$	1.32	\$20.96	10.067%	62.559%	37.441%	5.969%
2006	\$	2.35	\$	1.39	\$21.65	10.857%	59.149%	40.851%	4.004%
2007	\$	2.76	\$	1.44	\$22.27	12.396%	52.174%	47.826%	3.625%
2008	\$	2.57	\$	1.52	\$23.12	11.118%	59.144%	40.856%	3.150%
2009	\$	2.83	\$	1.60	\$24.30	11.648%	56.537%	43.463%	5.229%
2010	\$	2.73	\$	1.68	\$25.48	10.714%	61.538%	38.462%	4.242%
2011	\$	2.39	\$	1.75	\$26.39	9.056%	73.222%	26.778%	2.719%
2012	\$	2.22	\$	1.79	\$26.97	8.233%	80.631%	19.369%	2.042%
2013	\$	2.24	\$	1.83	\$27.50	8.145%	81.696%	18.304%	1.833%
2014	\$	2.16	\$	1.85	\$27.95	7.729%	85.648%	14.352%	1.548%
2015	\$	1.96	\$	1.86	\$28.30	6.927%	94.898%	5.102%	0.782%
	R	ecent Fiv	ve Ye	ar Arithm	etic Average	8.0%	83.2%	16.8%	1.8%
			Rec	ent Five	Year Median	8.1%	81.7%	18.3%	1.8%
		Te	n Ye	ar Arithm	etic Average	9.7%	70.5%	29.5%	2.9%
				Ten '	Year Median	9.9%	67.4%	32.6%	2.9%

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Table I South Jersey Industries, Inc. Financial Data & Calculations

	Earnings per	Dividends per	Average Book Value per	Average Return on Common Equity	Dividend Payout Ratio	Earnings Retention Ratio	Internal Growth Rate
Years	Share	Share	Share	<u>"r"</u>	<u>(1-b)</u>	<u>"'b"</u>	<u>"br"</u>
2001	\$0.57	\$0.37	\$3.77	15.139%	64.912%	35.088%	5.312%
2002	\$0.61	\$0.38	\$4.38	13.943%	62.295%	37.705%	2.228%
2003	\$0.68	\$0.39	\$5.24	12.989%	57.353%	42.647%	-0.153%
2004	\$0.79	\$0.41	\$5.92	13.356%	51.899%	48.101%	-0.151%
2005	\$0.86	\$0.43	\$6.48	13.282%	50.000%	50.000%	12.294%
2006	\$1.23	\$0.46	\$7.15	17.203%	37.398%	62.602%	13.778%
2007	\$1.05	\$0.51	\$7.84	13.401%	48.571%	51.429%	8.308%
2008	\$1.14	\$0.56	\$8.40	13.580%	49.123%	50.877%	7.568%
2009	\$1.19	\$0.61	\$8.90	13.378%	51.261%	48.739%	6.847%
2010	\$1.35	\$0.68	\$9.33	14.469%	50.370%	49.630%	7.534%
2011	\$1.45	\$0.75	\$9.94	14.595%	51.724%	48.276%	8.127%
2012	\$1.52	\$0.83	\$10.98	13.843%	54.605%	45.395%	10.323%
2013	\$1.52	\$0.90	\$12.14	12.526%	59.211%	40.789%	10.459%
2014	\$1.57	\$0.96	\$13.15	11.944%	61.146%	38.854%	9.121%
2015	\$1.44	\$1.02	\$14.14	10.187%	70.833%	29.167%	6.389%
	Recent Fi	ve Year Arithn	netic Average	12.6%	59.5%	40.5%	8.9%
		Recent Five	Year Median	12.5%	59.2%	40.8%	9.1%
	To	en Year Arithn	netic Average	13.5%	53.4%	46.6%	8.8%
		Ten	Year Median	13.5%	51.5%	48.5%	8.2%

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Table I Southwest Gas Financial Data & Calculations

					Average Book	Average Return	Dividend	Earnings	Internal
	Ea	rnings	Div	idends	Value	on Common	Payout	Retention	Growth
		per		per	per	Equity	Ratio	Ratio	Rate
Years	<u>S</u>	<u>hare</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>Share</u>	Share	<u>"r"</u>	<u>(1-b)</u>	<u>''b''</u>	<u>"br"</u>
2001	\$	1.15	\$	0.82	\$17.05	6.747%	71.304%	28.696%	1.936%
2002	\$	1.16	\$	0.82	\$17.59	6.595%	70.690%	29.310%	-0.712%
2003	\$	1.13	\$	0.82	\$18.17	6.221%	72.566%	27.434%	-3.477%
2004	\$	1.66	\$	0.82	\$18.80	8.830%	49.398%	50.602%	6.967%
2005	\$	1.25	\$	0.82	\$19.14	6.531%	65.600%	34.400%	6.222%
2006	\$	1.98	\$	0.82	\$20.34	9.735%	41.414%	58.586%	7.806%
2007	\$	1.95	\$	0.86	\$22.28	8.752%	44.103%	55.897%	5.381%
2008	\$	1.39	\$	0.90	\$23.24	5.982%	64.748%	35.252%	2.036%
2009	\$	1.94	\$	0.95	\$23.97	8.095%	48.969%	51.031%	4.546%
2010	\$	2.27	\$	1.00	\$25.03	9.069%	44.053%	55.947%	5.497%
2011	\$	2.43	\$	1.06	\$26.14	9.296%	43.621%	56.379%	5.594%
2012	\$	2.86	\$	1.18	\$27.51	10.398%	41.259%	58.741%	6.397%
2013	\$	3.11	\$	1.32	\$29.41	10.575%	42.444%	57.556%	6.400%
2014	\$	3.01	\$	1.46	\$31.21	9.644%	48.505%	51.495%	5.781%
2015	\$	2.92	\$	1.62	\$32.78	8.908%	55.479%	44.521%	3.966%
	R	ecent Fiv	ve Ye	ar Arithm	etic Average	9.8%	46.3%	53.7%	5.6%
			Rec	cent Five	Year Median	9.6%	43.6%	56.4%	5.8%
		Te	en Ye	ar Arithm	etic Average	9.0%	47.5%	52.5%	5.3%
				Ten `	Year Median	9.2%	44.1%	55.9%	5.5%

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Table I WGL Holdings, Inc. Financial Data & Calculations

		rnings per		vidends per	Average Book Value per	Average Return on Common Equity	Dividend Payout Ratio	Earnings Retention Ratio	Internal Growth Rate
Years		<u>hare</u>	_	<u>Share</u>	Share	<u>"r"</u>	<u>(1-b)</u>	<u>''b''</u>	<u>''br''</u>
2001	\$	1.88	\$	1.26	\$15.78	11.918%	67.021%	32.979%	3.930%
2002	\$	1.14	\$	1.27	\$16.01	7.121%	111.404%	-11.404%	-0.905%
2003	\$	2.30	\$	1.28	\$16.02	14.362%	55.652%	44.348%	6.256%
2004	\$	1.98	\$	1.30	\$16.60	11.928%	65.657%	34.343%	4.113%
2005	\$	2.13	\$	1.32	\$17.38	12.259%	61.972%	38.028%	4.809%
2006	\$	1.94	\$	1.35	\$18.33	10.584%	69.588%	30.412%	3.791%
2007	\$	2.09	\$	1.37	\$19.35	10.804%	65.550%	34.450%	4.201%
2008	\$	2.44	\$	1.41	\$20.41	11.955%	57.787%	42.213%	5.390%
2009	\$	2.53	\$	1.47	\$21.44	11.800%	58.103%	41.897%	5.308%
2010	\$	2.27	\$	1.50	\$22.36	10.154%	66.079%	33.921%	4.204%
2011	\$	2.25	\$	1.55	\$23.16	9.717%	68.889%	31.111%	3.681%
2012	\$	2.68	\$	1.59	\$24.07	11.137%	59.328%	40.672%	4.882%
2013	\$	2.31	\$	1.66	\$24.65	9.373%	71.861%	28.139%	2.845%
2014	\$	2.68	\$	1.72	\$24.37	10.999%	64.179%	35.821%	1.388%
2015	\$	3.16	\$	1.83	\$24.53	12.885%	57.911%	42.089%	5.423%
	R	ecent Fiv			etic Average		64.4%	35.6%	3.6%
			Rec	cent Five	Year Median	11.0%	64.2%	35.8%	3.7%
		Te	en Ye		etic Average	10.9%	63.9%	36.1%	4.1%
				1 en	Year Median	10.9%	64.9%	35.1%	4.2%

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CAPM Cost of Common Equity

Table I Dial free 1	Interest Rate and Estimated Risk Premium

Morningstar's Estimated Geometric Long-run Market Return	10.00%
Morningstar's Estimated Risk-free Interest Rate on 20-year Treasury Bond	<u>5.60%</u>
Estimated Risk Premium	4.40%

Table II OCA Utilities' Adjusted Betas					
				Betas	
	1	Atmos Energy Corporation	ATO	0.75	
	2	Spire Inc	SR	0.70	
	3	New Jersey Resources Corporation	NJR	0.80	
	4	Northwest Natural Gas Company	NWN	0.65	
	5	South Jersey Industries, Inc.	SJI	0.80	
	6	Southwest Gas	SWX	0.75	
	7	WGL Holdings, Inc.	WGL	0.75	
	8	Utility Sample Arithmetic	Average	0.74	
	9	Utility Sample	Median	0.75	
	10	* *	Utility Sample Minimum		
	11		Utility Sample Maximum		
Table III Sample Utilities' CAPM Cost of Common Equity					
	12	Atmos Energy Corporation	ATO	8.9%	
	13	Spire Inc	SR	8.7%	
	14	New Jersey Resources Corporation	NJR	9.1%	
	15	Northwest Natural Gas Company	NWN	8.5%	
	16	South Jersey Industries, Inc.	SJI	9.1%	
	17	Southwest Gas	SWX	8.9%	
	18	WGL Holdings, Inc.	WGL	8.9%	
	19	Utility Sample Arithmetic	Average	8.9%	
	20	Utility Sample	_	8.9%	
	21	Utility Sample M		8.5%	
	22	Utility Sample M		9.1%	

Analysis: The CAPM cost of common equity (K) is equal to the risk free interest rate (I) plus the product of the market risk premium (RP) multiplied by beta (b). The equation is (I) + b * (RP) = k.

Sources: Betas are from Value Line Investment Surveys included in Schedule B. The long-run stock market return and 20-year Treasury bond yield are from Morningstar's 2015 Yearbook (Ibbotson SBBI 2015 Classic Yearbook, Morningstar, p. 40).

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Morningstar's Estimated Risk Premium, Volatility and Declining Risk Premiums

Table I			Discrete	Discrete	Realized
			Common	US Treasury	Discrete
			Stock	Bill	Risk
		Ann	ual Return	Annual Return	<u>Premium</u>
		Col.	<u>a</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>c</u>
		Over	all Period	<u> 1926 -2015</u>	
1	A	verage Returns	12.2%	3.5%	8.7%
2	Stan	dard Deviation	20.1%	3.2%	20.5%
3		Maximum	53.9%	14.7%	53.5%
4		Minimum	-43.3%	0.0%	-44.4%
Table II		More Distant Pa	ast Period	<u> 1926 - 1968</u>	
5	Α	verage Returns	13.3%	1.8%	11.4%
6	Stan	dard Deviation	23.0%	1.9%	23.3%
7		Maximum	53.9%	7.7%	53.5%
8		Minimum	-43.3%	0.0%	-44.4%
Table III		More Rece	ent Period	<u> 1969 - 2015</u>	
9	A	verage Returns	11.3%	5.0%	6.3%
10	Stan	dard Deviation	17.4%	3.4%	17.5%
11		Maximum	37.4%	14.7%	32.4%
12		Minimum	-36.9%	0.0%	-38.5%
Table IV	Comparison of Ro	eturns and Risk l	<u>Premiums</u>		
13	More Distant Past Period	1926 - 1968	13.3%	1.8%	11.4%
14	More Recent Period	1969 - 2015	11.3%	5.0%	6.3%

Analysis: Table I depicts the overall data on returns and risk premiums. Table II depicts older data and Table III depicts more recent data on returns and risk premiums. Table IV compares the older period to the more recent period. Note in Table IV (Col. c, Row 13 compared to Row 14) how risk premiums have declined. The more recent period's risk premium is considerably smaller than the more distant past.

According to Morningstar's estimates, stock returns have declined (Col. a, Row 13 compared to Row 14), stocks have become less risky (Col. a, Row 6 compared Row 10), government bill returns have increased (Col. b, Row 5 compared to 9), and government bills have become more risky (Col. b, Row 6 compared to 10).

Since returns depend on risks and the stock market is now less risky and the Treasury bond market is now more risky, the expected return on stocks has decreased and the expected return on bonds has increased to reflect these risks.

Because the risk premium is the difference between the expected returns of stocks and Treasury securities, risk premiums, as a mathematical necessity must decrease.

Notes: The standard deviation is an indicator of volatility and risk. The higher the risks, the higher the expected return on that asset. The risk premium is the difference between the return on stocks and the return on U. S. Treasury securities. Differences are due to rounding.

Source: Ibbotson SBBI 2015 Yearbook, Duff & Phelps, Appendix Tables B-1, B-5 and B-9.

		Common Stock	Discrete Common	Long-term T-Bond Total	Discrete Long-term	T-Bond Realized Discrete	T-Bill Total	Discrete	T-Bill Realize Discret
	Year	Return Index For Year Ended	Stock Annual Return	Return Index For Year Ended	T-Bond Annual Return	Risk <u>Premium</u>	Return Index For Year Ended	T-Bill Annual Return	Risk Premiu
olumn/Row	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>G</u>	H H	<u>I</u>
1 2	1925 1926	1 1.116	11.600%	1 1.078	7.800%	3.800%	1 1.033	3.300%	8.300%
3	1927	1.535	37.545%	1.174	8.905%	28.639%	1.065	3.098%	34.4479
4 5	1928 1929	2.204 2.018	43.583% -8.439%	1.175 1.215	0.085% 3.404%	43.498% -11.843%	1.103 1.155	3.568% 4.714%	40.0159 -13.154
6	1930	1.516	-24.876%	1.272	4.691%	-29.567%	1.183	2.424%	-27.300
7 8	1931 1932	0.859 0.789	-43.338% -8.149%	1.204 1.407	-5.346% 16.860%	-37.992% -25.009%	1.196 1.207	1.099% 0.920%	-44.437 ⁹
9	1932	1.214	-8.149% 53.866%	1.406	-0.071%	53.937%	1.211	0.331%	53.5349
10	1934	1.197	-1.400%	1.547	10.028%	-11.429%	1.213	0.165%	-1.5659
11 12	1935 1936	1.767 2.367	47.619% 33.956%	1.624 1.746	4.977% 7.512%	42.642% 26.444%	1.215 1.217	0.165% 0.165%	47.4549 33.7919
13	1937	1.538	-35.023%	1.75	0.229%	-35.252%	1.221	0.329%	-35.352
14 15	1938 1939	2.016 2.008	31.079% -0.397%	1.847 1.957	5.543% 5.956%	25.536% -6.352%	1.221 1.221	0.000% 0.000%	31.0799 -0.3979
16	1940	1.812	-9.761%	2.076	6.081%	-15.842%	1.221	0.000%	-9.7619
17	1941	1.602	-11.589%	2.096	0.963%	-12.553%	1.222	0.082%	-11.671
18 19	1942 1943	1.927 2.427	20.287% 25.947%	2.163 2.208	3.197% 2.080%	17.091% 23.867%	1.225 1.229	0.245% 0.327%	20.0429 25.6219
20	1944	2.906	19.736%	2.27	2.808%	16.928%	1.233	0.325%	19.4119
21 22	1945 1946	3.965 3.645	36.442% -8.071%	2.514 2.511	10.749% -0.119%	25.693% -7.951%	1.237 1.242	0.324% 0.404%	36.1179 -8.4759
23	1947	3.853	5.706%	2.445	-2.628%	8.335%	1.248	0.483%	5.223%
24 25	1948 1949	4.065 4.829	5.502% 18.795%	2.529 2.692	3.436% 6.445%	2.067% 12.349%	1.258 1.272	0.801% 1.113%	4.7019 17.6829
26	1949	6.36	31.704%	2.693	0.445%	31.667%	1.272	1.113%	30.525
27	1951	7.888	24.025%	2.587	-3.936%	27.961%	1.306	1.476%	22.549
28 29	1952 1954	9.336 14.108	18.357% 51.114%	2.617 2.617	1.160% 0.000%	17.197% 51.114%	1.328 1.328	1.685% 0.000%	16.6729 51.1149
30	1955	18.561	31.564%	2.87	9.668%	21.896%	1.385	4.292%	27.271
31 32	1956 1957	19.778 17.646	6.557% -10.780%	2.71 2.912	-5.575% 7.454%	12.132% -18.234%	1.419 1.464	2.455% 3.171%	4.1029 -13.951
33	1958	25.298	43.364%	2.734	-6.113%	49.477%	1.486	1.503%	41.861
34	1959	28.322	11.954%	2.673	-2.231%	14.185%	1.53	2.961%	8.9939
35 36	1961 1962	36.106 32.955	27.484% -8.727%	2.673 3.282	0.000% 22.783%	27.484% -31.510%	1.53 1.648	0.000% 7.712%	27.484 -16.439
37	1963	40.468	22.798%	3.322	1.219%	21.579%	1.7	3.155%	19.642
38 39	1964 1965	47.139 53.008	16.485% 12.450%	3.438 3.462	3.492% 0.698%	12.993% 11.752%	1.76 1.829	3.529% 3.920%	12.955 8.5309
40	1966	47.674	-10.063%	3.589	3.668%	-13.731%	1.916	4.757%	-14.819
41 42	1967 1968	59.104 65.641	23.975% 11.060%	3.259 3.251	-9.195% -0.245%	33.170% 11.306%	1.997 2.101	4.228% 5.208%	19.748 5.8529
43	1969	60.059	-8.504%	3.086	-5.075%	-3.428%	2.239	6.568%	-15.072
44	1970	62.465	4.006%	3.46	12.119%	-8.113%	2.385	6.521%	-2.5159
45 46	1971 1972	71.406 84.956	14.314% 18.976%	3.917 4.14	13.208% 5.693%	1.106% 13.283%	2.49 2.585	4.403% 3.815%	9.9119 15.161
47	1973	72.5	-14.662%	4.094	-1.111%	-13.551%	2.764	6.925%	-21.586
48 49	1974 1975	53.311 73.144	-26.468% 37.202%	4.272 4.665	4.348% 9.199%	-30.815% 28.003%	2.986 3.159	8.032% 5.794%	-34.499 31.409
50	1976	90.584	23.843%	5.447	16.763%	7.080%	3.319	5.065%	18.778
51	1977	84.076	-7.184%	5.41	-0.679%	-6.505%	3.489	5.122%	-12.307
52 53	1978 1979	89.592 106.112	6.561% 18.439%	5.346 5.28	-1.183% -1.235%	7.744% 19.674%	3.74 4.128	7.194% 10.374%	-0.6339 8.0659
54	1980	140.513	32.420%	5.071	-3.958%	36.378%	4.592	11.240%	21.179
55 56	1981 1982	133.615 162.221	-4.909% 21.409%	5.166 7.251	1.873% 40.360%	-6.783% -18.951%	5.267 5.822	14.699% 10.537%	-19.609 10.8729
57	1983	198.743	22.514%	7.298	0.648%	21.866%	6.335	8.811%	13.7029
58 59	1984 1985	211.197	6.266%	8.427 11.037	15.470%	-9.204%	6.959	9.850%	-3.5849 24.4429
60	1985	279.114 330.668	32.158% 18.471%	13.745	30.972% 24.536%	1.186% -6.065%	7.496 7.958	7.717% 6.163%	12.3079
61	1987	347.965	5.231%	13.372	-2.714%	7.945%	8.393	5.466%	-0.2359
62 63	1988 1989	406.455 534.456	16.809% 31.492%	14.665 17.322	9.669% 18.118%	7.140% 13.374%	8.926 9.673	6.351% 8.369%	10.4599 23.1239
64	1990	517.499	-3.173%	18.392	6.177%	-9.350%	10.429	7.816%	-10.988
65 66	1991	675.592	30.549% 7.670%	21.942 23.709	19.302% 8.053%	11.248% -0.383%	11.012	5.590% 3.505%	24.959 4.1659
67	1992 1993	727.412 800.078	9.990%	28.034	18.242%	-8.252%	11.398 11.728	2.895%	7.0949
68	1994	810.538	1.307%	25.856	-7.769%	9.077%	12.186	3.905%	-2.5989
69 70	1995 1996	1113.918 1370.946	37.429% 23.074%	34.044 33.727	31.668% -0.931%	5.762% 24.005%	12.868 13.538	5.597% 5.207%	31.833 17.868
71	1997	1828.326	33.362%	39.074	15.854%	17.509%	14.25	5.259%	28.103
72 73	1998 1999	2350.892 2845.629	28.582% 21.045%	44.178 40.218	13.062% -8.964%	15.519% 30.008%	14.942 15.641	4.856% 4.678%	23.726 16.367
73 74	2000	2845.629 2586.524	-9.105%	40.218 48.856	-8.964% 21.478%	-30.583%	15.641	4.678% 5.895%	-15.000
75	2001	2279.127	-11.885%	50.662	3.697%	-15.581%	17.197	3.828%	-15.712
76 77	2002 2003	1775.341 2284.785	-22.104% 28.696%	59.699 60.564	17.838% 1.449%	-39.942% 27.247%	17.48 17.659	1.646% 1.024%	-23.750 27.672
78	2004	2533.204	10.873%	65.717	8.508%	2.364%	17.871	1.201%	9.6729
79 80	2005 2006	2657.559 3077.329	4.909% 15.705%	70.852 71.694	7.814% 1.188%	-2.905% 14.607%	18.043 19.287	0.962%	3.9479 8.9019
80 81	2006	3077.329 3246.391	15.795% 5.494%	71.694 78.779	9.882%	-4.388%	20.186	6.895% 4.661%	0.8339
82	2008	2049.448	-36.870%	99.161	25.872%	-62.742%	20.509	1.600%	-38.470
83 84	2009 2010	2591.824 2982.24	26.464% 15.063%	84.383 92.942	-14.903% 10.143%	41.368% 4.920%	20.529 20.553	0.098% 0.117%	26.367 14.946
85	2010	3045.218	2.112%	119.183	28.234%	-26.122%	20.562	0.117%	2.0689
86	2012	3532.562	16.004%	123.125	3.308%	12.696%	20.574	0.058%	15.945
87 88	2013 2014	4676.682 5316.85	32.388% 13.689%	109.138 135.185	-11.360% 23.866%	43.748% -10.178%	20.579 20.583	0.024% 0.019%	32.364 13.669
89	2015	5390.425	1.384%	132.321	-2.119%	3.502%	20.586	0.015%	1.3699
maa. Ilahataan	CDDI 20	015 Voorbook Duff (Dhalna Annand	iv Taklas D 1 D 5	and B.O.				
		015 Yearbook, Duff & Period 1926 - 2015	c 1 ncips, Append	ιλ 1 αυι c 8 D-1 , B-5	ши D -7.				
89		Average Standard Daviation	12.217%		6.171%	6.045%		3.546%	8.6719
90 91 92		Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum	20.094% 53.866% -43.338%		10.196% 40.360% -14.903%	22.717% 53.937% -62.742%		3.228% 14.699% 0.000%	20.479 ^o 53.534 ^o -44.437
	ant Past	Period 1926 - 1968	15.550/0		1-1.703/0	02.1 → 270		0.000/0	+. +.)/
93 94		Average Standard Deviation	13.267% 23.010%		3.085% 6.023%	10.182%		1.844%	11.423°
94 95		Standard Deviation Maximum	23.010% 53.866%		6.023% 22.783%	24.391% 53.937%		1.895% 7.712%	23.335 53.534
96		Minimum	-43.338%		-9.195%	-37.992%		0.000%	-44.437
	Recent	Period 1969 - 2015	11 2010/		0.07407	2.42601		E 0300/	
97 98		Average Standard Deviation	11.301% 17.361%		8.864% 12.214%	2.436% 20.739%		5.030% 3.429%	6.271 ° 17.524
99		Maximum	37.429%		40.360%	43.748%		14.699%	32.364
100		Minimum	-36.870%		-14.903%	-62.742%		0.015%	-38.470

Source: Ibbotson SBBI 2015 Yearbook, Duff & Phelps, Appendix Tables B-1, B-5 and B-9.

RPU-2016-0003

OFFICE OF CONSUMER ADVOCATE DATA REQUEST

DATE: September 16, 2016

DOCKET NO. : RPU-2016-0003

COMPANY : Liberty Utilities (Midstates Natural Gas) Corp.

d/b/a Liberty Utilities

WITNESS : Keith Magee (with information provided by John Peellegoda)

SUBJECT : Capital Structure

REFERENCE: Liberty Utilities' Responses to OCA Data Request Nos. 2–7.

- 17. Please explain how Liberty Utilities obtained the long-term debt and common equity that is included in Liberty's response to OCA Data Request Nos. 2–7. As part of the explanation, identify whether or not Liberty Utilities obtains capital directly from the market. If Liberty Utilities does not obtain capital directly from the market, please respond to the following:
 - A. How is Liberty Utilities' actual capital structure determined? Is it based on target ratios, hypothetical ratios, or assigned ratios?
 - B. Provide copies of all documentation which sets forth the process by which Liberty Utilities obtains capital, and/or is allocated or assigned capital from LuCo.
 - C. Provide a narrative explanation of the affiliate relationship between LuCo and Liberty Utilities, including the services LuCo provides to Liberty Utilities and any charges billed to Liberty Utilities.

Response: The utility, Liberty Utilities (Midstates Natural Gas) Corp. does not obtain capital directly from the market. Liberty Utilities obtains long term debt through its financing affiliate, Liberty Utilities Co. ("LUCo"); and its equity is ultimately sourced through its publicly traded parent, Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp. ("APUC").

- A. Liberty Utilities parent company, LUCo, targets an investment grade capital structure.
- B. Liberty Utilities, the utility, does not have any documents responsive to this request, however, its parent company, LUCo, targets an investment grade capital structure.
- C. Liberty Utilities Co. ("LUCo") is the immediate parent company of Liberty Utilities (Midstates Natural Gas) Corp. d/b/a Liberty Utilities. LUCo provides financing for Liberty Utilities, including guarantees, short-term loans, and long-term capital debt financing on terms and conditions that the parties memorialize in written agreement(s). In 2015, charges approximated \$161,000.

Information for this response was provided by John Pellegoda, Senior Manager of Treasury.

NOTE: In the event the response to this data request contains confidential information, do not simply mark the entire response or attached document(s) confidential. Please highlight, or otherwise identify, the specific information that is claimed to be confidential.